ࡱ> ?A>q` 3bjbjqPqP .@::+,  K $hi^      - o 0KX :4  K$  D,( AJB mss Add mss 49,738 corres with Robert Cecil, 1917 refs from Cassar and Rothwell ff49-51 ms C to AJB, 22 April 1917 bottom f 49verso: L.G.[sic] has met Sonnino &[sic] Ribot // f 50 in Savoy. I gather he has gven Smyrna to the Italians as well as all the part you offered. As to Greece there was apparently no progress. Meanwhile Robertson & Jellicoe are clamouring for a with drawal from Salonica on the score of tonnage leaving the French in undisputed possession to defend Salonica. That I think will hardly do. However we are to have one more blow at the Bulgarians anyhow. // f 50 verso All our accounts confirm the confusion & distress in Germany & Austria especially in the matter of rolling stock. Bulgaria is nibbling. Turkey is almost done for. The soldiers there are very pleased with themselves. [] f 51 We are all gushing over the U.S. a little overdoing it. ff 64-66 ts copy letter from Mr. Ian Malcolm to Lord Robert Cecil6 May 1917 starts with statements re AJBs health-good f64 2. The French have come and gone. They dont seem to have intended to do any work and didnt do any. But they made a most effective acte de presence. Joffre captivated the mob immediately, and Viviani made a few very telling speeches. But the whole show was Joffres funeral;[sic] he was the popular figure all through, and not even Vs[sic] eloquence, in a tongue not understanded of the people, could get him the ovations accorded to the magician of the Marne much to his obvious annoyance. They are now collecting boquets in the provinces, and we are to meet them in New York at a joint banquet next Friday night. point 3 includes The Irish have been presistent but not too troublesome. It seems very unfair // f 65 that we should be bothered by them at all. We dont worry them about any of their domestic affairs, but they are thinking about their own damned politics all the time, and they dont care if they do make things uncomfortable for the head of our Mission. However they havent got much change out of him so far, and he has on each occasion scored a heavy personal success. point 4 The Conferences between experts are going slowly, but surely, and well on the whole. It is very dificult here to get beyond the stage of words (which mean so much here) to the region of deeds. But all our men are showing admirable patience, and are prodigal of assistance in every possible way; they are very highly appreciated not only for what they do and say, but for the tactful and sympatheritci manner in which they speak and act. ff 68-69 ms Draft tel. to Sir C. Spring Rice:- Following for Drummond, personal and secret 7 May 1917 f 68 Paris Conference of May 4 & 5 shewed complete agreement between Haig, Robertson and Ptain (Nivelle is practically dgomm), removed French tendence to assume the defensive, and secured definite understanding to prosecute was along whole line, with full strength. ends f 69 Position of Ribot Ministry is weak. f 95 ts original signed Bertie, 21 May 1917 from Paris Confidential starts I have spoken to M. Jules Cambon on the subject of the unfitness of Monsieur Guernier, the French Representative on the Inter-Allied Shipping Board. He is Deputy for St Malo and his appointment wasa political job. M. Cambon says that unless some specific shortcomings can be stated against him the French Government could not withdraw him. Sir Austin Lee informs me that the claims of M. Andr Lebon to this post were strongly urged by competent persons at the time the appointment was made, but M. Leon was Minister for the Colonies for some time during the Dreyfus crisis and it was he who gave the orders for the stricter confinement of Dreyfus, which caused so much stir at the time. He is a Suez Canal Director, was formerly President of the :Messageries Maritimes, speaks English fluently, is easy to get on with and, in short, appears to have the necessary diplomatic and business qualifications, but M. Jules Cambon saus that for that reason the French Government could not venture to appoint him. ff 142-3 ts letter from R.C. to My dear Arthuir, 29 August 1917, with ms PS starting on f 143 There was rather a painful scene with Robertson yesterday. L.G.[sic] had suggested that we ought to send guns [added above line & ammunition from Ypres] to the Italians so that they might be relieved of anxiety about their reserves in this respect & push their victory home [added above line & we should abandon our offensive]. Ropbertson was brought back from his holiday to discuss this on the footing that L.G. would also be there. The latter did not turn up, & R.[sic] delivered a philippic against the whole condict of the war by the present Cabinet bringing out all is old grievances about Nivelle &c.[sic] He made a strong case. Derby told us afterwards that // f 143 verso he had arrived at the W.O.[sic] in the most violent excitement overwrought he thought. [?Nigs??] who is staying with me & acting as a kind of liaison officer between the Munitions and W.O. tols ne last evening the whole W.O. was seething with indignation. Robertson went so far as to say that Haig had received no support from the Cabinet & I gather Haig shares this view. Carson & I were much impressed & would have liked to say that we quite agreed as you know I do in thinking ot would be wrong to stop the Western offensive for the sake of sending help to Italy. But B/L[sic] & Milner would not let us though I did get in one sentence in that direction. It is the old story. The soldiers believe the little man is intriguing with the French or the Italians or someone. Robertson bitterly resents that way he is personally treated just like Jellicoe. I felt the same when you were in America. ff147-152 ms confidentila letter Rc to AJB, 4 Sept 1917 re LG & guns for Italy & WR furious The result was a telegram to Rodd asking if Cadorna wanted them badly [added above line & whether if he had them he could obtain a decisive success]. No direct reply came but presently came a telegram from Delme Radcliffe stating the condition // f147 verso of his ammunition - & that he would be glad of any additional guns &c he could get. He added that his offensive would go on for anotjer month or six weeks so that he would have plenty of time to egt the guns if they were sent. About the same time as this telegram arrived L.G.[sic] saw Albert Thomas who was over for the Allied Socialist Conference & shortly after A.T.s[sic] return to Paris a message came to the W.O. that the French had received an appeal from Cadorna for guns & that they proposed to withdraw 100 guns from their First Army // f 148 which as you know is under Haigs command & send them & that Foch was coming over to urge this on the Govt[t super]. All the W.O. led by Eddy Derby believed that it was a put up job between A.T. & l.G. But I know of no evidence except the coincidence of time that this was so. Anyhow L.G. was keener than ever to let the guns go & used the argument that if we did not do so we should disgruntle Italy & lose our position there in exchange for France a fantastic prophecy. But of course it would be a good thing to oblige Italy of we could & the French offer of Guns beiong used by us was character- // f 148 verso istic. The main arguument urged by Foch was that Cadorna was going to get a considerable success over the Austrians, that at the best we could only beat the Germans & that there was no chance of knocking them out whereas a serious military defeat might just finish off the Austrians. Haig & Robertson were both here. Robertson wobbled a little pressed by the political argument. But Haig was very clear that the removal of a hundred guns would seriously hamper him, would necessitate a complete recopnstruction of his plans & might make it necessary to break off his offensive. RC view is had committed to WF off after prolomged consideration & highly objectionable to break off in Flanders for a ;chance success elsewhere. LG agreed to let generals decide DH f 150 refused to agree but said he would obey orders. Foch said he was sure no guns could be sent except from the Flanders front. But the P.M. insisted. RC dissociated himself from unfair decision thinking of resigning bec has f 151no confidenjce in his strategic intuition as B.L. has. He seems to me to have been wrong about Nivelle repeatedly wrong about Salonika slightly insane about Palestine Still less do I like the way he treats Robertson & Jellicoe. f 164 ms letter to AJG, 18 Nov 1917 starts Further reflection (in bed) has made me more distrustful than ever of the Supreme War Council. Taken with the Paris speech there can be very little doubt that one of the purposes which the P.M. had in view was to enable him to over-rule the C.I.G.S. & other advocates of the Western front. Churchills presence at the luncheon confirms this & so does the article in this mornings Observer. In other words he wants to create machinery which will enable him to receive & act on // verso military advice independent of the General Staff. That is to say, there are to be two supreme advisers of the Government on the general conduct of the war. That cannot work. It must mean division & confusion. [agains thinks of resigning unless HW made below WR] f165 is AJB dictated ts copy of reply, 19 Nov 1917RC shd not resign re SWC: he would be a rash man ewho would say that it was going to succeed. It certainly will not succeed if the personnages chiefly concerned military and political, but chiefly military try not to make it work. But I cannot believed the present system is satisfactory; and the only other alternative I have heard suggested is the one towards which the French are evidently going to press upon us, namely, a single Commander-in-Chief, for all the // verso Armies, and that Commander-in-Chief a Frenchman. Of such a solution I confess myself to be profoundly distrustful. does not want to bring govt down with Russia & Italy & Fr pol crisisnor is having 2 sources of advice necessarily a bad thing if govts retain final say much fewer letters in 1918 f 233 ts decypher of teleg Derby (Paris) to Drummiond, 7 Oct 1918, from Cecil to be decyphered by Private sec starts It is evident that we have reached a period of the war when close co-operation with the Americans is becoming increasingly desirable if we are to avoid misunderstandings. At present, the absence of any authoritative representative of the President makes any close co-operation difficult, if not impossible. Here Fraser has been waiting about outside the doors of the Conference to pick up crumbs of information, which are not given to him. Meanwhile, at Conference itself, [LG & Clem] vie with eachj other in scoffing at the President, and Sonnino is almost openly apprehensive of allowing him to interfere in European politics. send Pres or if not House-as only :satisfactory remedy ts reply from Drummond to Derby for Cecil, 8 Oct says Pres cannot come while elections and an invite wh bound to refuse wd have unfortunate effect-having House come while Reading in Europe wd deprive them of main channel of communication & means of influencing Wilson 6Q   : Y . 2 3 t u | }   6 7 !Ah2QRctuv*+DEFJx23Srh>'hd-h;UhhJhhchc>*h<hchIh7hOha`hM6TUx3 t u iF6oN(])^)3r~678Wv*0u'  !7!!"":#;#L#M#[#{###$#$'$B$huah z\hh $hOhENh\ht-h h;Uh hOhhh<h>'hd-JB$$$%#%C%%%%^'M(N((()) * **+<+?+R+[+p++++++@,v,w,,,, --?-E-d---{.~./////2333hhhh@ h9tgh9tg h9tg>*h)h9tghBhLh2l$h\AhOhBhM%hihOhua5^)w,x,/////$02233 ,1h/ =!"#$% @@@ NormalCJ_HaJmH sH tH DAD Default Paragraph FontRiR  Table Normal4 l4a (k(No List+@ z z z z '+6TUx3tuiF  6 o N ]!^!w$x$'''''$(**++!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!6TUx3tuiF  6 o N ]!^!w$x$'''''$(**++00000000000000000000000000000000000000000rB$3^)33&5jĨN:l.TLHl.NIl.8jN9jĩN:jN;jDNl.NJjNKjDNQl.ĮNRl.NSl.,YVl.DNWl. ?l.NOjDN\l.N]l.įN^l.N_l.DNTjNVjNAl.İNUU99 66""2!!!!'''+      !"#$%!!YYAA ;;'':!!!!'''+  !"#$%B$!*urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttagscountry-region9&&*urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttagsState8#*urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttagsCity9%%*urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttagsplace HFd&%%%$%$%$$%%&%%%$%$%$%$%$%%%%%6:U\x~v|34uwinrwFK  [ e o p %'W]adCE?BN V ^!_!C$I$x$|$''''''$(*(**+:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::$$$$>%?%d%d%%%''+++%$@ \EN $2l$xw%d-t-<\AO z\a`uac9tgB7LI );UM%>'OBJi @+++++@UnknownGz Times New Roman5Symbol3& z Arial"1hճ&ճ&a%Oa%O24++3HX)?2AJB mss Add mss 49,738MGMGOh+'0t  0 < HT\dlAJB mss Add mss 49,738MGNormalMG2Microsoft Office Word@F#@Vo@Voa%՜.+,0 hp|  ANUO+ AJB mss Add mss 49,738 Title  "#$%&'()*+,-/012345789:;<=@Root Entry F`g oB1Table!WordDocument.@SummaryInformation(.DocumentSummaryInformation86CompObjq  FMicrosoft Office Word Document MSWordDocWord.Document.89q